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“NATURAL BORN” DISPUTES IN THE 2016
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Derek T. Muller*
INTRODUCTION
The 2016 presidential election brought forth new disputes concerning the
definition of “natural born Citizen.”1 The most significant challenges
surrounded the eligibility of Senator Ted Cruz,2 born in Canada to a Cuban
father and an American mother.3 Unlike challenges to President Barack
Obama’s eligibility, which largely turned on conspiratorial facts, challenges
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. Special thanks to
Jerry Goldfeder and the Fordham Law Review for organizing this important discussion
concerning election law arising out of the 2016 presidential election. Derek O’Reilly-Jones
provided invaluable research assistance. This Article is part of a forum entitled Election
Law and the Presidency held at Fordham University School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
2. See Green v. Cruz, No. 5:16-cv-00207-HGD (N.D. Ala. May 10, 2016); Schwartz v.
Cruz, No. H-16-106, 2016 WL 1449251, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2016), aff’d, No. 1620231 (5th Cir. June 21, 2016) (per curiam); Fischer v. Cruz, No. 16-CV-1224(JS)(ARL),
2016 WL 1383493, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2016); Wagner v. Cruz, No. 2:16-cv-55-JNP (D.
Utah Mar. 18, 2016), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2395 (2016); Librace v. Martin, No. 4:16-cv00057-BSM (E.D. Ark. Feb. 29, 2016); Voeltz v. Cruz, No. 15-022044(02) (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Mar. 14, 2016); Smallwood v. State, No. SCEC-16-0000330 (Haw. Apr. 21, 2016); Korman
v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. 522647 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 24, 2016), appeal denied,
No. 2016-374 (N.Y. Apr. 1, 2016); Elliot v. Cruz, 137 A.3d 646 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016),
aff’d, 134 A.3d 51 (Pa. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-13, 2016 WL 3570607 (U.S. Oct. 3,
2016); Joyce v. Cruz, 16 SOEB GP 526 (Ill. State Bd. of Elections Jan. 28, 2016); Graham v.
Cruz, 16 SOEB GP 527 (Ill. State Bd. of Elections Jan. 28, 2016); Graham v. Rubio, 16
SOEB GP 528 (Ill. State Bd. of Elections Jan. 28, 2016); Elliot v. Cruz, BLC 2015-2 (N.H.
Ballot Law Comm’n 2015); Laity v. Cruz, BLC 2015-4 (N.H. Ballot Law Comm’n 2015);
Williams v. Cruz (Williams II), OAL Nos. STE 5016-16, STE 5018-16 (N.J. Office of
Admin. Law Apr. 13, 2016); Tony Cook, Cruz, Rubio Presidential Candidacies Face
Citizenship Challenges in Indiana, INDYSTAR (Feb. 19, 2016), http://
www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2016/02/18/cruz-rubio-presidential-candidacies-facecitizenship-challenges-indiana/80560572/ [https://perma.cc/4876-43DL]; see also Derek T.
Muller, Status of Pending “Natural Born Citizen” Challenges and Litigation in 2016
Presidential Election, EXCESS DEMOCRACY, http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2016/2/
status-of-pending-natural-born-citizen-challenges-and-litigation-in-2016-presidentialelection (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/5C36-F5D6].
3. While this Article focuses on these disputes, challenges concerning other candidates
did exist. Some challenges attacked Marco Rubio’s eligibility—he was born in the United
States to Cuban immigrant parents. See, e.g., Laity, BLC 2015-4. Additionally, challenges
concerning Rick Santorum (son of an Italian immigrant) and Bobby Jindal (son of Indian
immigrants) were also filed but abandoned early. See Email from Robert Laity to Joseph
Foster, Att’y Gen., State of N.H. (Nov. 13, 2015, 5:17 AM), http://sos.nh.gov/WorkArea/
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=8589951073 [https://perma.cc/X5LJ-ZWB5].
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to Cruz’s eligibility turned principally on the law and garnered more serious
attention concerning a somewhat cryptic constitutional clause.
Understandably, much attention focused on the definition of “natural born
citizen” and whether candidates like Cruz qualified.4 Administrative
challenges and litigation in court revealed deficiencies in the procedures for
handling such disputes. This paper exhaustively examines these challenges,
identifies three significant complications arising out of these disputes, and
urges a solution for future presidential elections.
Accordingly, Part I of this Article briefly discusses the history of natural
born citizen litigation. Part II then highlights how agencies tasked with
administering elections and reviewing challenges to candidate eligibility
often construed their own jurisdiction broadly. But good reasons exist for
construing such jurisdiction narrowly—after all, voters, political parties, the
Electoral College, and Congress all may scrutinize whether a candidate is a
natural born citizen, and unless the legislature has expressly spoken
otherwise, these agencies should defer to others before deciding whether to
keep a candidate off the ballot.
Part III examines how, although litigation in federal court usually led to
swift dismissal on a procedural ground, challenges in state proceedings
sometimes led to broad—and incorrect—pronouncements about the power
to scrutinize the eligibility of presidential candidates. A state court in
Pennsylvania and the New Jersey Secretary of State each erroneously held
that neither the Electoral College nor Congress has the power to review the
qualifications of candidates.5 While state legislatures may well have
empowered a state court or an elections official to review qualifications, it
is not because of an absence of other capable bodies to do so. Compressed
timeframes to file briefs and inadequately prepared decision makers led to
sloppy findings that linger as precedent for future litigation.
Part IV discusses how decision makers repeatedly mused about how
useful it would be if the U.S. Supreme Court offered a clear definition of
“natural born citizen.” Some reached the outright conclusion that Cruz was
qualified for office. Others found that he was not so obviously unqualified
4. See, e.g., Paul Clement & Neal Katyal, On the Meaning of “Natural Born Citizen,”
128 HARV. L. REV. F. 161 (2015); Michael D. Ramsey, The Original Meaning of “Natural
Born” (Jan. 7, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2712485 [https://perma.cc/7YPS-FTGC]; Akhil Reed Amar, Why
Ted Cruz Is Eligible to Be President, CNN (Jan. 14, 2016, 11:59 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2016/01/13/opinions/amar-cruz-trump-natural-born-citizen/index.html [https://perma.cc/Y5
EG-JYSF]; Bryan A. Garner, Memorandum: Is Ted Cruz Eligible for the Presidency?,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/ted-cruzeligibility-memo/424206/ [https://perma.cc/9MVP-3244]; Thomas Lee, Is Ted Cruz a
‘Natural Born Citizen’?: Not If You’re a Constitutional Originalist, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10,
2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-lee-is-ted-cruz-eligible-to-bepresident-20160110-story.html [https://perma.cc/9MUR-B9YK]; Rob Natelson, Claims That
Senator Cruz Is Not “Natural Born” Need to Be Taken Seriously, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Jan.
11, 2016, 11:45 PM), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2016/01/
claims-that-sen-cruz-is-not-natural-born-need-to-be-taken-seriouslyrob-natelson.html
[https://perma.cc/M5V5-P49A].
5. See infra Part III.
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as to keep his name off the ballot. Repeatedly, however, they expected a
final judicial pronouncement from the highest court to resolve the matter
rather than leaving the matter to the voters, Electoral College, or Congress.
This suggests that executive and state judicial actors are uncomfortable with
nonfederal judicial resolution of a constitutional claim like this one.
Finally, Part V offers a small recommendation. After three consecutive
presidential election cycles with time-consuming and costly litigation, it
may well be time to amend the Constitution and abolish the natural born
citizen requirement. Although no court has excluded any major party
candidate from the ballot on such grounds yet, the procedural wrangling
and political uncertainty surrounding the issue may counsel in favor of a
simpler, easy-to-administer standard for future candidates. Amending the
Constitution is admittedly no simple task. But perhaps an uncontroversial
amendment would find broad support in order to avoid delays and legal
challenges seen in recent presidential primaries and elections.
I. HISTORY OF “NATURAL BORN CITIZEN” LITIGATION
AND TRADITIONAL MECHANISMS FOR OVERSEEING
A CANDIDATE’S ELIGIBILITY
Disputes over presidential qualifications are hardly of recent vintage,6 but
voluminous and serious litigation over such disputes is assuredly new. The
proliferation of litigation surrounding Barack Obama (born in Hawaii to a
Kenyan father and raised for some years in Indonesia) and John McCain
(born in the United States-controlled Panama Canal Zone) was
unprecedented.7 The bulk of the litigation surrounded conspiracy theories
regarding Obama, often allegations that he was actually born in Kenya or
Indonesia, which meant he was not a natural born citizen8 and therefore not
qualified to serve as President of the United States.9 Most challenges were
raised in courts, often by individuals who lacked standing to bring such
claims in the first place.10 Because most claims were thrown out on
procedural or jurisdictional grounds, almost no tribunal actually weighed in
on the definition of “natural born citizen.”11
But courts are not the only place where such claims could be addressed.
I have previously argued that there are several bodies that have the ability to
scrutinize a presidential candidate’s eligibility.12 Consider the many actors
with political (and legal) opportunities to review the qualifications of
presidential candidates: primary voters; political parties and convention

6. See, e.g., Jill A. Pryor, Note, The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential
Eligibility: An Approach for Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty, 97 YALE L.J.
881, 882 n.6 (1988).
7. See Derek T. Muller, Scrutinizing Federal Electoral Qualifications, 90 IND. L.J. 559,
576 (2015).
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
9. See generally Muller, supra note 7, at 576 & nn.134–36.
10. See id. at 576–77 & nn.132–41.
11. See id.
12. See generally id.
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delegates; general-election voters; presidential electors; and, last but not
least, Congress.
A. Primary Voters
The presidential primaries include robust opportunities to debate whether
candidates are eligible for office, and voters may evaluate such arguments.
When Hillary Clinton supporters raised challenges to Barack Obama’s
eligibility in 200813 or when Donald Trump openly questioned Ted Cruz’s
eligibility in 2016,14 voters could evaluate the claims as a part of their
decision-making process. It is the first of two opportunities for voters—the
second being the general election.15
B. Political Parties and Convention Delegates
The parties themselves can stipulate as to whether their candidates meet
the qualifications needed to be their presidential and vice-presidential
nominees.16
They may deny the party’s nomination to ineligible
candidates.17 The Republican National Convention’s decision in 2016 to
count 484 delegates’ votes cast for Ted Cruz, for instance, may well reflect
the party’s view that Cruz is constitutionally eligible.18 Additionally, while
the parties typically constrain delegates to vote for the candidates they were
pledged to support, delegates who are not pledged to a candidate (perhaps
after a round of voting at the convention) are also free to consider the
purported eligibility of candidates, much as voters do.
C. General-Election Voters
General-election voters are not required to behave in a particular fashion
in their decision-making process, and they are free to consider a wide range
13. See Ben Smith & Byron Tau, Birtherism: Where It All Began, POLITICO, http://
www.politico.com/news/stories/0411/53563.html (last updated Apr. 24, 2011, 5:33 PM)
[https://perma.cc/5B6C-36KR].
14. Todd J. Gillman, Trump Questions Cruz Eligibility, and Canada-Born Senator Says
Rival Has ‘Jumped the Shark,’ DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 5, 2016), http://
trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/2016/01/trump-questions-cruz-eligibility-canada-bornsenator-says-rival-has-jumped-the-shark.html/ [https://perma.cc/SK2V-ZZ5Q].
15. See infra Part I.C.
16. Cf. Chad Flanders, What Do We Want in a Presidential Primary—An Election Law
Perspective, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 901, 922 (2011).
17. Cf. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., DELEGATE SELECTION MATERIALS FOR THE 2016
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION r. 12(K) (2014), http://www.demrulz.org/wp-content/
files/12.15.14_2016_Delegate_Selection_Documents_Mailing_-_Rules_Call_Regs_Model_
Plan_Checklist_12.15.14.pdf (describing criteria for the Democratic presidential candidates
“in addition to the requirements set forth by the United States Constitution”)
[https://perma.cc/NZ5A-TTWJ]; REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY r. 16(d)(5) (2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/prod-static-ngop-pbl/docs/Rules_of_
the_Republican+Party_FINAL_S14090314.pdf (prohibiting state laws that “hinder[],
abridge[], or den[y]” the right of constitutionally eligible candidates from being candidates)
[https://perma.cc/K7VY-9ERC].
18. Admittedly, in this particular case, the Republican National Convention rules do not
formally require candidates to be eligible, and no one formally objected to Cruz’s
nomination.
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of factors. One of those factors may well be a candidate’s constitutional
ineligibility—actual or perceived.19
D. Presidential Electors
Presidential electors theoretically exercise independent judgment in
casting votes for the President and Vice President, and they could reject
candidates they found to be ineligible. Practically, few electors today
exercise such independent judgment and almost uniformly cast votes
consistent with the candidate they are pledged to support. Some states also
compel electors to take an oath to support their pledged candidate; a few
make it a crime to be a faithless elector or, alternatively, refuse to count
their votes.20
But electors have historically had the power to exercise independent
judgment in voting. That role is particularly significant when the candidate
has passed away before the electors meet. In 1912, for instance, eight
electors who pledged to support William Howard Taft cast vice-presidential
votes for Nicholas Butler after Taft’s Vice President, James Sherman, died
just days before the election.21 And in 1872, electors scattered their votes
for presidential candidates after Horace Greeley died between Election Day
and the meeting of the Electoral College.22 They were not simply
exercising independent judgment about whether these candidates deserved
their votes. Presumably, they were also scrutinizing the qualifications of
candidates and concluded that dead men were ineligible for executive
office.
E. Congress
While Congress’s power to judge the qualifications, elections, and
returns of its own members is well established,23 its power in presidential
election is less certain. Congress is given the power to count the electoral
votes cast for President and Vice President.24 A robust debate in 1800 left
open the question whether Congress had the power to independently
19. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 63, 94 (1990); see also Muller, supra note 7, at 579–80 & nn.152–53.
20. See Muller, supra note 7, at 571–72.
21. See Joshua Spivak, Could Trump Drop Out?, USA TODAY (Aug. 9, 2016, 5:47 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/08/09/trump-drop-out-race-ballot-republicansryan-delegates-november-column/88450076/ [https://perma.cc/CK7D-5L5H]; see also
Historical Election Results: Electoral College Box Scores 1789–1996, NAT’L ARCHIVES &
RECORDS ADMIN.: U.S. ELECTORAL C., https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoralcollege/scores.html#1912 (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Q24U-GUPX].
22. See Muller, supra note 7, at 586–87.
23. See, e.g., Lisa Marshall Manheim, Judging Congressional Elections, 51 GA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017); see also Joshua A. Douglas, Procedural Fairness in Election Contests,
88 IND. L.J. 1, 24–29 (2013) (describing statutes promulgated by Congress designed to
resolve election congressional disputes). See generally Franita Tolson, What Is Abridgment?:
A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA. L. REV. 433 (2015) (describing Congress’s power
to reduce a state’s delegation in the House of Representatives if the state abridges the right to
vote).
24. See Muller, supra note 7, at 585.
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evaluate whether the candidates were eligible for office or whether its task
counting electoral votes was simply ministerial.25 In 1873, however, the
House refused to count three electoral votes cast for the deceased Horace
Greeley—an exercise of its independent discretion to review the
qualifications of candidates.26
F. State-Level Implications
These opportunities to resolve questions about a candidate’s eligibility
ought to give states some pause. Should states be in the business of
scrutinizing whether candidates are eligible for office, or should they
simply accept the paperwork of candidates as a ministerial task and let the
electoral process play out? Given other opportunities to settle the question
in the political process, what role, if any, should courts play in this
decision-making process?
States have no constitutional duty to scrutinize the qualifications of
federal candidates.27 And states might simply be reluctant to empower
these officials; after all, there are ample opportunities to moot these
disputes. Indeed, consider that Cruz failed to secure the Republican
nomination.
But states also may have a desire to ensure that their voters are not
wasting their votes on ineligible candidates at any stage of the process.
State legislatures have the authority to empower election officials or state
courts with the power to resolve such disputes.28 In the event they choose
to do so, what should such scrutiny look like?
Despite the protracted, often frivolous litigation surrounding presidential
candidates in 2008 and 2012, most states did nothing—paving the way for
potential litigation surrounding the next candidate whose eligibility was at
all in question. Most of the litigation surrounding Obama turned on
findings of fact—usually, was he born in Hawaii, or was he secretly born in
Indonesia? Perhaps, then, states were reluctant to seriously address how
such disputes should be resolved given the frivolity of the claims.
Challenges29 surrounding Cruz, however, turned on conclusions of law
(similar to McCain). The facts around Cruz were not in dispute—he was
born to a Cuban father and an American mother in Canada. That left the
potential for more serious complications when election officials or courts
face these disputes.

25. See id. at 585–86.
26. See id. at 586–88.
27. See id. at 601 n.341.
28. See id. at 561.
29. The word “challenges” is deliberately broad. It is used here to refer to any formal
challenges to a candidate’s eligibility, whether a hearing before an administrative tribunal, a
petition to an election official, or a lawsuit filed in court.
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II. JURISDICTIONAL SCOPE OF ELECTION BOARDS
AND STATE COURTS
The first question confronting election officials or state courts in
resolving natural born citizen challenges raised during this election was
whether the arbiters even had the jurisdiction to hear such challenges to a
candidate’s eligibility. State legislatures define the power of administrative
officials and state courts. These tribunals might construe their jurisdiction
narrowly and refuse to hear such disputes absent a rather express directive
from the legislature. But most found jurisdiction rather easily, sometimes
despite plain language to the contrary.30
A. Illinois
Illinois law requires that presidential candidates sign a statement of
candidacy that one is “qualified for the office.”31 The electoral board has
the power to review objections to the petition—whether they are in “proper
form,” “within the time and under the conditions required by law,”
“genuine,” and “valid.”32 Put another way, in Illinois, the “scope of inquiry
with respect to objections to nomination papers is limited to ascertaining
whether those papers comply with the provisions of the Election Code
governing such papers.”33 Other provisions of the Elections Code describe
the eligibility of candidates for state office.34 There is no question in
Illinois that the board has the power to scrutinize qualifications for state
office enunciated elsewhere in state law.35
But did the board have the power to decide whether a candidate for
President is a natural born citizen or otherwise meets provisions of the U.S.
Constitution? Yes, the board concluded; it had jurisdiction to hear such
challenges, including over whether Cruz was a natural born citizen.36 And
it went on to conclude that “Ted Cruz became a natural born citizen at the
moment of his birth” because his mother “was a U.S. citizen.”37
B. Indiana
The Indiana Election Commission is empowered to administer Indiana
election laws.38 Indiana law dictates that presidential candidates must meet
30. The jurisdictions discussed in this part are those that had any meaningful assessment
of the scope of their jurisdiction or the appropriate authority to engage in eligibility
determinations. Other jurisdictions also considered such challenges but dismissed them on
other grounds, like standing, without reaching these issues, or they summarily dismissed the
claims without meaningful analysis.
31. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5(3) (2016).
32. Id. at 5/10-10.
33. Bryant v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 865 N.E. 2d 189, 192 (Ill. 2007).
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. Joyce v. Cruz, 16 SOEB GP 526 (Ill. State Bd. of Elections Jan. 28, 2016); Graham
v. Cruz, 16 SOEB GP 527 (Ill. State Bd. of Elections Jan. 28, 2016); Graham v. Rubio, 16
SOEB GP 528 (Ill. State Bd. of Elections Jan. 28, 2016).
37. Id.
38. See IND. CODE ANN. § 3-6-4.1-14 (2016).
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the qualifications set forth in the U.S. Constitution,39 and the commission
may hear questions about the validity of candidacies.40 Candidates in
presidential primaries sign a request to appear on the ballot and include
petitions signed by voters.41 But, unlike candidates for other federal or
state offices governed by a different chapter, there is ostensibly no
requirement that the candidate even certify that he is eligible for office or
that he complies with the qualifications in Indiana state law.42
Parties filed petitions seeking to exclude Marco Rubio’s and Cruz’s
names from the ballot, challenging their eligibility before the commission.
During a hearing over Rubio’s eligibility, one member of the commission
thought that a question of subject matter jurisdiction “was the most direct
point and the more basic argument.”43 Another commissioner was more
uncertain about the question of jurisdiction.44 The commission then
entertained a motion that the challenge “be denied,” without clarification as
to whether it was a lack of jurisdiction or a finding on the merits, and the
motion was unanimously approved.45
An attorney representing Cruz claimed that the question was beyond the
jurisdiction of the commission and “lies solely before the U.S. Congress.”46
The commission again entertained a motion that “both petitions be denied,”
without clarification.47 After some extended discussion on the merits, the
commission denied the motion by a 3–1 vote.48
C. New Hampshire
New Hampshire law also requires candidates to sign a declaration under
penalty of perjury that they are “qualified to be a candidate for president of
the United States pursuant to . . . the United States Constitution, which
states, ‘No person except a natural born citizen . . . shall be eligible to the
office of the President . . . .’”49 The secretary of state reviews the
declarations for “regularity,” and such decisions “shall be final.”50 The
state’s Ballot Law Commission (BLC), however, is empowered to “hear
and determine disputes arising over whether nomination papers or
declarations of candidacy filed with the secretary of state conform with the
law.”51

39. See id. § 3-8-1-6(a).
40. See id. § 3-8-2-14.
41. See id. § 3-8-3-2.
42. See id. § 3-8-2-7(a)(5).
43. Transcript of Proceeding at 23, Challenge to Marco Rubio, Cause No. 2016-2 (Ind.
Election Comm’n Feb. 19, 2016), https://secure.in.gov/sos/elections/files/IEC_Minutes_
Feb_19_2016_Part_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5RL-26P4].
44. See id. at 25.
45. Id. at 26–28.
46. Id. at 34.
47. Id. at 43.
48. Id. at 49.
49. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 655:47(I) (2016).
50. Id. § 655:47(III).
51. Id. § 665:7.
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The BLC determined it has the power to hear disputes over whether a
candidate is a natural born citizen. It distinguished the power over
“regularity,” which resided with the secretary of state, from whether the
petitions “conform with the law,” a task for the BLC.52 Conformity with
law, it reasoned, included the power to review the presidential candidates’
qualifications.
In a challenge to Cruz’s eligibility, however, it offered an unusually
deferential standard of legal review. “Absent an obvious defect in a filing,”
the BLC explained, it would approve the reasonableness of the secretary of
state’s decision.53 “Clearly, there is no final decision on the meaning of
‘natural born citizen,’ and this Commission is not the appropriate forum for
the determination of major Constitutional questions.”54 The BLC likewise
found that there was no “obvious defect” in Cruz’s declaration.55
D. New Jersey
New Jersey law requires that petitions for candidacy include the
candidate’s name, residence, and office sought.56 It does not require a
certification that the candidate is eligible for office.57 Candidates must
submit petitions with sufficient signatures to appear on the ballot. Petitions
“in apparent conformity” with the law are “deemed to be valid” unless an
objection is filed.58 If an objection is filed, the secretary of state “shall in
the first instance pass upon the validity of such objection” to a petition.59
A New Jersey administrative law judge accepted that the secretary of
state “is obliged to rule” on a question of Cruz’s eligibility.60 And the
secretary of state embraced this conclusion. There was no scrutiny of the
jurisdictional basis for doing so; jurisdiction was assumed. After all, a
petition’s validity means that it conforms with state law—that it includes
the proper number of valid signatures, that it was filed on time, and so on.
Nothing in state law requires candidates to certify that they meet the
qualifications enumerated in the Constitution. Indeed, it is a reason an
avowedly unqualified candidate like Nicaraguan citizen Róger Calero
appeared on the New Jersey ballot in 2004 and 2008 as the presidential
candidate for the Socialist Workers Party.61 And while state law does
52. Elliot v. Cruz, BLC 2015-2 (N.H. Ballot Law Comm’n 2015); see also Laity v. Cruz,
BLC 2015-4 (N.H. Ballot Law Comm’n 2015).
53. Elliot, BLC 2015-2; see also Laity, BLC 2015-4 (rejecting a challenge to Marco
Rubio’s candidacy for identical reasons).
54. Elliot, BLC 2015-2; see also Laity, BLC 2015-4.
55. Elliot, BLC 2015-2; see also Laity, BLC 2015-4.
56. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-4 (West 2016).
57. See id.
58. Id. § 19:13-10.
59. Id. § 19:13-11.
60. Williams v. Cruz (Williams I), OAL Nos. STE 5016-16, STE 5018-16, slip op. at 4
(N.J. Office of Admin. Law Apr. 12, 2016) (initial decision by administrative law judge).
61. See FEC, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2004: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT,
THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 27–39 (2005), http://
www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalelections2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Z2G-F67L]; FEC,
FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2008: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE
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permit an election contest on the basis that the incumbent was not “eligible
to the office,” that is only triggered “at the time of the election.”62 New
Jersey’s statute looks to be quite deferential to the political process and
would not permit judicial and administrative review of presidential
candidates. But an administrative law judge, and the secretary of state,
construed the statute broadly to assert jurisdiction.63
E. New York
An outlier among these challenges came from New York. The New
York State Board of Elections was aware of legal challenges surrounding
Cruz when it agreed to permit his name to appear on the ballot.64 During
discussions about this litigation, one board member indicated that the “goal
is not for us to get involved in the substance,” with another affirming, “[w]e
have limited jurisdiction.”65 They allowed the judiciary to handle the
dispute. And in that dispute, the courts did not need to address the
jurisdictional question after they concluded the petitions were untimely.66
F. Florida
Challenges to Rubio’s and Cruz’s eligibility were filed in Florida state
court.67 In a somewhat complicated procedural posture, the plaintiff sued
Rubio, Cruz, and the Florida secretary of state. The plaintiff then
voluntarily dismissed the claim against the secretary of state. When the
court considered Rubio’s and Cruz’s motions to dismiss, it issued a threepart ruling: the voluntary dismissal of the secretary of state was fatal to the
rest of the case; the plaintiff lacked standing; and even if the plaintiff had
standing, the plaintiff’s “substantive arguments reside in the hands of the
United States Congress.”68 While it might have been better to cite the lack
of jurisdictional authority in Florida rather than a bare recital of Congress’s
authority, it reflected another court deferring to the existing dispute
resolution mechanisms rather than assume authority existed.

AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 27–40 (2009),

http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/
federalelections2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/36HH-F7KJ].
62. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29-1(b).
63. See Williams I, OAL Nos. STE 5016-16, STE 5018-16, slip op at 25; see also
Williams v. Cruz (Williams II), OAL Nos. STE 5016-16, STE 5018-16 (N.J. Office of
Admin. Law Apr. 13, 2016) (final decision by Secretary of State adopting administrative law
judge’s findings).
64. See generally N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, Commissioners Meeting Transcript (Feb.
23, 2016), http://www.elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/News/MeetingMinutes/CCTranscriptions
02232016.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KPX-TNTF].
65. Id. at 10.
66. See Korman v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. 522647 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 24,
2016), appeal denied, No. 2016-374 (N.Y. Apr. 1, 2016).
67. See, e.g., Voeltz v. Cruz, No. 15-022044(02) (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 14, 2016).
68. Id.
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G. Reflections on Jurisdiction
In a nation of fifty states, it is hardly surprising to see great diversity in
how states administer presidential elections and presidential preference
primaries.69 The Constitution leaves to the discretion of each state
legislature to decide the manner in which such elections take place.70 Some
have given election boards and state courts some power to review
qualifications (or, at least, have been interpreted to do so); others have not.
But in instances where decision makers do assert the authority to hear such
challenges, they can encounter difficulties assessing the law that governs
these disputes.
III. ERRORS OF LAW
Most election boards and state courts concluded, expressly or implicitly,
that they had authority to hear challenges to Cruz’s eligibility. They
frequently dismissed such challenges on other grounds, for example,
because the challenge was filed in an untimely fashion71 or the plaintiff
lacked standing to raise the challenge.72 But some courts also made
erroneous statements of constitutional law concerning the Electoral College
and Congress.
A. New Jersey
A New Jersey administrative law judge focused on whether a dispute
over Cruz’s eligibility was a political question, reserved to a branch of
government other than the judiciary.73 Most simplistically, the political
question doctrine asks whether the Constitution forbids a court to answer
certain questions of law because the resolution of those issues has been
committed to another branch of government. For example, one such
question concerns whether the power to review is a textually demonstrable
commitment to another branch of government.74 But there are times where
other branches may still examine questions of law and courts may
independently examine the same questions.75
In New Jersey, the judge provided an inaccurate statement of law when
he confused the political question doctrine with state jurisdiction:
69. See generally Derek T. Muller, Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College, 44
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1237 (2012).
70. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
71. See, e.g., Korman, No. 522647 (discussing the lower court’s dismissal for
untimeliness of the claim).
72. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Cruz, No. H-16-106, 2016 WL 1449251, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr.
13, 2016); Wagner v. Cruz, No. 2:16-cv-55-JNP (D. Utah Mar. 18, 2016).
73. See Williams v. Cruz (Williams I), OAL Nos. STE 5016-16, STE 5018-16, slip op. at
3–4 (N.J. Office of Admin. Law Apr. 12, 2016).
74. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); see also Tara Leigh Grove,
The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1914 (2015);
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Presidential Election Dispute, the Political Questions Doctrine,
and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Reply to Professors Kent and Shane, 29 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 603, 607 (2001).
75. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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The Electoral College is not vested with the power to determine the
eligibility of the Presidential candidate since it is only charged to select
the candidate for each office and transmit its votes to the “seat of
government.” Congress has no power over this process . . . except where
a tie vote occurs . . . . Congress is not afforded [a] role in connection with
the issue of Presidential eligibility. There is no basis to conclude that the
issue of eligibility of a person to serve as President has been textually
committed to Congress or the Electoral College.76

The last sentence does not follow from the previous several, which are
incorrect as a matter of law. Both the Electoral College and Congress have
the power to review the qualifications of candidates. The election of 1872
is the paradigmatic example, as noted earlier.77 Horace Greeley died after
Election Day but before the Electoral College met.78 Most electors cast
their votes for someone else—presumably because they believed that
Greeley was no longer eligible to serve as President.79 And when Congress
was confronted with three electoral votes for the deceased Greeley, it
refused to count them—again, presumably because it believed that he was
no longer eligible to serve as President.80 Both bodies adjudicated the
qualifications of presidential candidates.81
So the Electoral College and Congress may review qualifications of
presidential candidates. But it is another thing entirely to say that these
bodies possess the sole authority to do so, to the exclusion of the judicial
branch. The political question doctrine, as articulated by the Supreme
Court, involves a “textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department.”82 That means a commitment to another
branch in such a way that the judiciary cannot interfere. State legislatures
are permitted to empower state courts or state election officials to review
qualifications.83 They may choose not to do so, but they could task review
to the courts if they so desired. The New Jersey administrative law judge,
however, apparently worried that ceding any authority to review
qualifications might deprive his court of the ability to review them. And he
decided to deny the Electoral College and Congress any role whatsoever, a
clear error.
The secretary of state adopted the reasoning of the
administrative law judge in its entirety, errors and all.84
B. Pennsylvania
A state judge in Pennsylvania committed a similar error as the New
Jersey court: “[T]he Constitution does not vest the Electoral College with
76. Williams I, OAL Nos. STE 5016-16, STE 5018-16, slip op at 4–5.
77. See supra Part I.
78. See Muller, supra note 7, at 586–87.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
83. See supra Part II.
84. See Williams v. Cruz (Williams II), OAL Nos. STE 5016-16, STE 5018-16 (N.J.
Office of Admin. Law Apr. 13, 2016).
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power to determine the eligibility of a Presidential candidate since it only
charges the embers [sic] of the Electoral College to select a candidate for
President and then transmit their votes to the nation’s ‘seat of
government.’”85 But what does the power to “select” mean if it does not
include the discretion to decide whether someone is fit for office—
including, perhaps, whether someone is eligible for office?
The judge went on to find that Congress also lacked such power: “[N]o
Constitutional provision places such power in Congress to determine
Presidential eligibility. Moreover, other than setting forth the bare
argument, the Candidate offers no further support for the contrary
proposition.”86 Perhaps a failure to adequately brief the court in the haste
of resolving a time-sensitive ballot access dispute led to this finding. But
Congress’s refusal in 1873 to count electoral votes cast for the deceased
Greeley suggests that power does in fact reside in Congress to determine
presidential eligibility, as rarely as that power might have been used.87
Indeed, the Senate’s proclamation in 2008 that John McCain was a natural
born citizen suggests that Congress, to this day, believes it has the power to
review the qualifications of presidential candidates.88
C. Reflections on Errors of Law
Perhaps these judges have some excuse for their errors. The period of
time between the opening briefs to the final decision was sometimes a
matter of days, typical of short-fuse litigation in challenges to candidates’
petitions for ballot access. The formal role of the Electoral College and of
Congress in presidential elections is rarely considered in contemporary
legal disputes. While the parties and press often emphasized the merits of
the natural born citizen dispute, perhaps less attention may have been given
to these more rote procedural matters. But by asserting jurisdiction to hear
these claims, the courts set themselves up for erroneous statements of law.
Appellate tribunals were far more cautious. They mostly summarily
affirmed or affirmed without comment as to the basis of the finding. In
Pennsylvania, for instance, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the
order dismissing the case without explanation.89 But these lingering
judicial precedents make future litigation all the more complicated. Eager
plaintiffs now have multiple sources of inaccurate law to cite in furtherance
of their claims. Perhaps the risk of erroneous statements of law is a major
reason that many election tribunals expressly desired clarity and certainty in
the form of an opinion from the Supreme Court.

85. Elliot v. Cruz, 137 A.3d 646, 650–51 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016), aff’d, 134 A.3d 51
(Pa. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-13, 2016 WL 3570607 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2016).
86. Id. at 651.
87. See supra notes 26, 80 and accompanying text.
88. See S. Res. 511, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted) (resolving unanimously that Senator
McCain is a natural born citizen); see also Muller, supra note 7, at 587–89.
89. See Elliot, 134 A.3d at 51.
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IV. A DESIRE FOR CERTAINTY AND JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
When election administrators heard these eligibility challenges, they
often asserted jurisdiction.90 But they also frequently expressed reluctance
that they should be the ones who handled such disputes. They preferred
that a court—perhaps a federal court, or the Supreme Court—would hear
the challenge. For example, a commissioner in New York lamented,
“[T]his type of heavy decision should really be made in a federal court.”91
Another chimed in, “I agree with you that it’s an important issue that ought
to be resolved in the courts.”92 An Indiana commissioner complained, “I
wish that there was a way that we could transfer this directly to the
Supreme Court and let them rule.”93 After permitting Cruz to appear on the
ballot, the New Hampshire BLC concluded parenthetically: “[T]he
appropriate raising in and deciding of this question by a court equipped to
decide such Constitutional matters, so that all election officials and the
American people know once and for all the definition of ‘natural born
citizen,’ would be helpful in avoiding uncertainty.”94
The election officials seemed to be at a loss in deciding how to handle the
uncertainty before them. The term “natural born citizen” remained the
subject of some dispute. An Indiana commissioner thought that they should
err on the side of permitting the candidate on the ballot.95 The New
Hampshire BLC concluded that Cruz’s petition did not contain an
“obvious” defect.96 These are hardly sure statements of Cruz’s eligibility.
It is something of a curiosity, then, that these agencies would so easily find
jurisdiction and yet so desire to delegate the actual jurisdiction to another
court—rather than leaving the matter to the voters, Electoral College, or
Congress. It is a sign that executive and state judicial actors are
uncomfortable with nonjudicial resolution of constitutional claims like
these.
That discomfort perhaps counsels against state legislatures
empowering them to make such decisions. It is not obvious, however, that
judicial intervention, even from the Supreme Court, would offer the best
solution.
V. AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION
Solutions to this litigation are not simple. The jurisdictional and
procedural issues continue to entangle election officials and state courts in
vexatious challenges. Presidential elections are operated by the states,
which leaves discretion to fifty separate jurisdictions to handle such
disputes and will create a patchwork of solutions under the existing regime
(assuming individual states decide to seek solutions, a doubtful proposition

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See supra Part II.
N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, supra note 64, at 10.
Id.
Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 43, at 47.
Elliot v. Cruz, BLC 2015-2 (N.H. Ballot Law Comm’n 2015).
Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 43, at 46.
Elliot, BLC 2015-2.
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given the repetition of issues in 2016 that first arose in 2008 and 2012). A
small, but complicated, solution does exist: amending the Constitution.
A constitutional amendment concerning natural born citizens is nothing
new. The most recent serious attempt to abolish the natural born citizen
requirement arose from a proposal promulgated by Senator Orrin Hatch in
2003. The “Equal Opportunity to Govern” amendment would have
changed the natural born citizen requirement to a qualification that a
candidate be “20 years a citizen of the United States.”97 Such an
amendment was ostensibly targeted to permit obviously disqualified
candidates, like Austria-born former California Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger, an opportunity to run for President.98
The justifications for this clause appear to have fallen away in our
contemporary society. The Framers were likely worried that a foreign
monarch might swoop in and seize control of the fledgling republic.99 Even
assuming that the challengers to recent presidential candidates’ eligibility
are correct in their definition of “natural born citizen,” there is no serious
concern that Obama, McCain, or Cruz would turn America over to a foreign
sovereign. A twenty-year citizenship requirement seems reasonably
sufficient to protect against concerns of foreign incursion into the executive
branch.
Admittedly, some may believe that a twenty-year citizenship period is
insufficient and would prefer a thirty-year, or even longer, citizenship
period, perhaps coupled with a lengthy domestic residency requirement.
Matters of such policy would surely generate robust debate but all toward
the common end of providing greater clarity in our constitutional
qualifications for presidential and vice-presidential candidates.
If we need not fear longstanding citizens serving as President, then we
can help courts avoid these many challenges for generations to come.
Despite some academic scholarship offering concrete understandings of the
phrase, the administrative and judicial uncertainty surrounding the phrase
“natural born citizen” is a valuable basis for passing the amendment.100 It
would have prevented all these lawsuits concerning the eligibility of
presidential candidates. It would have moved political and legal resources
toward more meaningful endeavors.
Amending the Constitution is, I concede, no easy solution. But three
consecutive presidential election cycles have yielded major challenges to an
understanding of “natural born citizen.” A fourth cycle with such
challenges seems inevitable.101 But the last eight years have demonstrated
97. S.J. Res. 15, 108th Cong. (2003).
98. See Martin Kasindorf, Should the Constitution Be Amended for Arnold?, USA
TODAY (Dec. 3, 2016, 8:54 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/
2004-12-02-schwarzenegger-amendment_x.htm [https://perma.cc/22WK-Z7KZ].
99. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 164–66 (2005).
100. See, e.g., Sarah Helene Duggin & Mary Beth Collins, ‘Natural Born’ in the USA:
The Striking Unfairness and Dangerous Ambiguity of the Constitution’s Presidential
Qualifications Clause and Why We Need to Fix It, 85 B.U. L. REV. 53 (2005).
101. See Tim Alberta, Ted Cruz Isn’t Changing a Thing, NAT’L REV. (July 20, 2016,
10:21
PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/438144/interview-ted-cruz-2016-
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that the states lack an adequate procedural mechanism for reviewing the
Natural Born Citizen Clause, particularly in instances where its
understanding is a matter of some dispute. Their inability to do so counsels
in favor of a federal, and more lasting, solution.

strategy-and-2020-plans (“There is no question Cruz will run for president again. . . . [H]is
2020 plans are likely to move forward no matter who wins the White House this fall . . . .”)
[https://perma.cc/W78T-EHDB].

